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ABSTRACT 
We try to determine whether capacity expansion timing in 
oligopoly among incumbents can be considered mobility 
deterring. We study the United Kingdom ´s petroleum refining 
industry between 1948 and 1998. Using tobit models, evidence 
is conclusive about accommodation among incumbents. We 
infer that excess capacity in this industry, instead of being a tool 
for strategic deterrence, has been the result of unexpected 
demand variability.  
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Introduction 
 
 The aim of the following paper is to determine whether Capacity Expansion 
(CE) timing among incumbents in a particular oligopoly market can be considered 
mobility deterring. While we will speak generally of high fixed-cost industries, due to 
research interests, we focus on the Petroleum refining industry. 
 The results obtained signal the importance of allowing for demand uncertainty to 
time CEs when firms compete in CE projects. This is revealed by this paper’s analysis, 
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where demand is assumed to be known with certainty. Besides, the frequent episodes of 
excess capacity make the petroleum refining industry an appealing case to study the 
interrelation between strategic and non-strategic factors in CE timing. 
 We test for the timing of CEs as mobility barriers. The U.K.´s petroleum-
refining industry is our case study. Surprisingly against the background, our results do 
not support the hypotheses that incumbents timed CE investments to deter each others 
during the period 1948-1998.  
Observe in industries like petroleum refining, due to product homogeneity, 
demand shocks usually happen at aggregate level. Since capital equipment is specific to 
this industry, the costs of CEs tend to be irreversibly sunk, thus (very) expensive 
commitments are generated when CEs are made.  
According to the models we test, incumbent firms in the U.K.´s petroleum-
refining industry committed resources when they expanded capacity during 1948-1998 
because they tried to use every unit of capacity added. On the other hand, our results 
show that excess capacity was primarily a consequence of demand variability. In fact, 
we show that excess capacity emerged as a consequence of unexpected demand shocks. 
Hitherto, timing issues when testing CEs as strategic tools among incumbents 
have been taken up tangentially (e.g., Lieberman [1987a, b] and Gilbert and Lieberman 
[1987]). For instance, the mentioned articles study investment rivalry across the same 
sample of U.S. chemical processes industries (between twenty-four and thirty-nine 
industries), during two decades
1
. 
                                               
1 When we assert that Lieberman [1987a,b] and Gilbert and Lieberman [1987] treat timing tangentially, 
we are asserting that these articles are not testing models where time is the decision variable. Rather, they 
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Amongst these articles, Lieberman [1987b] tests excess capacity as a barrier to 
mobility by estimating qualitative dependent variable models. There, the timing of CEs 
is analysed through pre-emptive strategies. While Lieberman searches for evidence on 
the use of excess capacity as a mobility barrier, he simultaneously studies whether 
incumbents tend to do anticipatory expansions. He does so by comparing CEs between 
incumbents and entrants and amongst incumbents themselves; he finds that incumbents 
tend to time CEs pre-emptively against each other, rather than against entrants. 
In this paper we adapt and re-state the models employed in Lieberman [1987b], 
with the aim of testing for the timing of (strategic) CEs among incumbents in the U.K.´s 
petroleum refining industry during the period 1948-1998. The timing of (strategic) CEs 
addressed to entrants is not contemplated in this study. 
 
Hypothesis to test 
Capacity built by incumbents after the commencement of entry either through 
construction of new refineries or additions to existent refineries, may serve mobility 
deterrence objectives. Moreover, since incumbents have shorter construction leads, they 
can expand existent refinery facilities more rapidly than for instance an entrant can 
build a new refinery (usually in a quarter of the time a new refinery takes, that is, in 
about six months). Excess capacity generated in this way may be equivalent to that of 
new refineries, but much less costly.  
                                                                                                                                         
are explicitly proposing an exogenous timing of CEs. The special feature of their models consists, as we 
will see, of associating a given exogenous timing to the (pricing) models they test. 
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Then incumbents can employ both refinery construction and incremental 
capacity to expand output and cut prices when they face other incumbents’ CEs. We call 
this kind of CE mobility deterring, because this can be addressed to deter the growth of 
existing competitors. 
 
HYPOTHESIS: If incumbents in the U.K.`s petroleum refining industry have timed 
CEs to deter the  mobility of other incumbents, then they have timed CEs 
strategically to generate excess capacity through the construction of new 
refineries and/or the addition of capacity to existing refineries after the 
commencement of entry. 
 
Data and variables 
As we have already mentioned, our main concern is to analyse mobility barriers, 
which exist whenever incumbents expand to deter each others’ CEs and by definition 
are feasible only after entry. Here we study CEs addressed at the rest of incumbents, 
that is, investment after commencement of entry or post-entry investment. 
Let Kt be the total industry capacity at the start of year t and be Qt the total 
industry output (including refinery fuel) during year t. The average growth rate of the 
industry in a medium term of three years is defined as 
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 Note capacity data are observed as stocks at the beginning of each year, while 
output data are flows over the course of the year. Post-entry CEs (CEs after 
commencement of entry) completed during year t, are the difference between capacity 
at the start of year t and capacity at the start of year t+1. 
Expansions of existing plants are usual in petroleum refining. In order to 
examine mobility barriers, we study investment by incumbents under two forms: 
Construction of Greenfield refineries and increments upon existent refineries. Entrants, 
by definition, can invest only in Greenfield refineries. Given that there are lags in the 
investment process, the actual expansion decision in either case occurs, respectively, 
during years t-2 and t-1. 
We record the impact of industrial concentration levels on (strategic) CEs 
timing, based on the following Herfindahl-Hirschman index computed at the start of 
each observation year: 
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where tiK ,  represents the capacity of firm i to produce petroleum refining products at 
the start of year t.  
Lieberman [1987b] sustains that the change in total industry capacity during year 
t has the following components in post-entry investments: 
entrants;by   completedcapacity plant  Greenfield:EtK  
;incumbentsby  completedcapacity plant  Greenfield:ItK  
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and plants; existing of expansions lincrementa Total: tK  
downshut Capacity : tK  
 Then the total industry capacity stock at the start of year t is 
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 Gestation lags for new CEs must be considered. Taking into account these lags, 
we denote new refinery investment by entrants and incumbents respectively as  
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Where 
t
tE 2  represents the Greenfield refinery capacity initiated by entrants 
during year t-2 and completed during year t, expressed as a fraction of the capital stock 
of the industry at the start of year t and 
t
tI 2 has the same interpretation for the 
Greenfield refinery capacity built by incumbents. 
 In petroleum refining activities, incremental CEs typically have a gestation lag 
of almost one-year. The rate of incremental CEs by incumbents is therefore: 
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We assume that incremental CEs are perfectly divisible (no lumpiness).  
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Capacity Expansion Timing and Excess Capacity models  
 
Consider, first, the simple case without entry in which all investment takes the 
form of incremental CEs on existing refineries by incumbents. For this section, let us 
assume that demand grows stochastically over time. Incumbents are able to forecast 
demand and aim to hold an industry capacity stock,
1
ˆ
tK , at the end of year t of: 
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Where 1ˆ tQ  represents the expected profit maximising output in year t+1 and 1/ 
is its optimal rate of capacity utilisation, which may be a function of capital costs, 
demand variability, and other factors.  
On the other hand, with one-year gestation lag for incremental CEs, the 
incumbent must forecast future demand in year t-1 and then take the steps to adjust the 
capital stock accordingly. The desired rate of investment, ttK
*
1
 , initiated during year t-1 
and completed during year t, which is targeted to reach the desired stock K

 in year t+1 
is 
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If expected annual demand change is Qˆ , using (1), we re-write (2) as  
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 Thus, the desired incremental CEs in year t can be written as a function of the 
capacity utilisation (U) and the expected rate of demand growth in year t-1. We can 
express this as 
 
)4(ˆ 111
*
  tgtu
t
t gUK 
  
 
Empirically, 1tU  can be observed, but 1ˆ tg  cannot. We use 1tg , the last year´s 
average rate of output growth, as a proxy for 1ˆ tg . The true expected rate of growth 
equals this rate plus an unexpected component 1
~
tg , i.e, 111
~ˆ
  ttt ggg . 
 Now consider the case where incumbents’ investment may include both 
Greenfield refineries (I) and incremental CEs of existing facilities. Suppose 
illustratively that firms meet part of their investment needs with Greenfield refineries 
and then cover the remainder with incremental CEs
2
.  
 Given the lags for Greenfield refinery construction, an investment decision must 
be made in year t-2 for the refinery to open in year t. In the following year t-1 
incumbents project incremental CEs, such that: 
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2 The other way round is also feasible, we do it in this manner just for stating the model. 
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The parameter  indicates the extent to which incumbents adjust incremental 
CEs to accommodate their lumpy new refineries scheduled to open in year t. Hence 
investment has a recursive structure, with new refinery investment initiated in year t-2, 
followed by incremental investment in year t-1, both of which will be targeted to reach 
the desired capacity stock 
1
ˆ
tK  by the end of year t.  
Let us now expand the model to include investment by entrants, who can invest 
only in Greenfield refineries (E). Therefore, incremental CEs will be estimated through: 
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The dependent variable
t
tK 1
 , denotes the amount of incremental CE in year t as a 
fraction of the total industry capacity at the start of the year. To control for the 
downward inflexibility of existent refinery capacity, we truncate 
t
tK 1
  at zero for 
observations where the original value is negative. Thus we treat observations with zero 
or negative values identically. Consequently, we use tobit analysis to fit equation (6). 
Lieberman [1987b] asserts that if the incremental investment is perfectly 
divisible and flexible both upward and downward, then 1 , i.e., Greenfield refinery 
investments initiated in year t-2 are perfectly accommodated through reductions of 
incremental investments in year t-1. We hold that this effect would underscore any 
mobility-deterrence character of CEs timing, because across the industry incremental 
CEs may accommodate Greenfield refinery construction. 
However, in the same article Lieberman also asserts, in the practice, there are 
numerous reasons why such a perfect accommodation might fail to occur. With multiple 
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incumbents, information or co-ordination problems may arise
3
. These features of 
competition interaction would lead to an incomplete accommodation, because 
incremental investments would not complement Greenfield investments.  
Consequently, we could speak of mobility deterrence CE timing if 1 , 
because across the industry Greenfield refineries would not be accommodated through 
incremental CEs on existing refineries
4
. 
 Consequently, on equation (6), we test sub-hypotheses 
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If sub-hypothesis 1) were rejected, then sub-hypothesis 
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should not be rejected for asserting that incumbents in the U.K.´s Petroleum Refining 
Industry timed incremental CEs with mobility deterring purposes during the period 
1948-1998. 
                                               
3 If incremental CEs are lumpy and it is better to be above the target capital than below it, accommodation 
will be incomplete. 
4 Likewise, an additional feature limiting accommodation is that existing refinery capacity tends to be 
inflexible downward. Given sunk investment costs, firms in a growing market are unlikely to make 
permanent refinery closures in response to brief market downturns or temporary over-capacity arising 
from completion of lumpy new refineries. In other words, 
t
tK
*
1
  will seldom be negative. In any case, as 
we mentioned above, the problem can be coped with econometrically by treating observations with zero 
or negative net investment identically using tobit analysis. 
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On the other hand, for our industry we define excess capacity as the difference 
between the capacity that minimises the average total costs of any refinery and its actual 
capacity. In order to test our hypothesis, we analyse the creation of excess capacity after 
commencement of entry to match it to the outcomes of the model in equation (6). 
Let us suppose that tQ is produced at the minimum average total costs. It is 
necessary to remark that refineries are usually closed for maintenance between 18 and 
36 days a year. Consequently, we choose a threshold of 7.5% capacity “surplus” for 
determining the existence of excess capacity properly speaking. Therefore, summing 
across refineries, we compute excess capacity at industry level tS  for each observation 
year as: 
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Also following Lieberman´s [1987b] definitions, a second measure of excess 
capacity, 
'
tS , is computed, but adjusting for differences in new capacity lumpiness.      
When capacity is lumpy, even with perfect co-ordination firms might hold 
excess “lumps” for non-deterring reasons. Hence, in order to correct for this, to 
compute
'
tS , we omit from tK the largest capacity increment added during the prior 
three years or during the most recent year of investment, if no expansion occurred 
during the prior three-year period, that is, 
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Lieberman [1987b] points out that profit-maximising firms hold non-deterrence 
aimed excess capacity in markets where demand is cyclical or stochastic, or where 
refineries are inherently lumpy or subject to economies of scale. Optimal idle capacity 
increases with demand variability under a range of structural conditions, going from 
perfect competition to monopoly.  
He adds that if refineries are lumpy, temporary excess capacity normally arises 
after new refineries are constructed, particularly if prices are not completely flexible. If 
more than one production technology is available, low variable but high fixed costs 
refineries may be held in reserve to serve periods of peak demand. According to him, 
the dependent variable 
'
tS  corrects for such lumpiness. Then, construction of new 
refineries and/or additions on existent refineries has a lagged effect (if any).  
For our hypothesis not to be rejected, we need to find statistically significant 
positive coefficients with respect to variables (7) and (8) models in relation to the 
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incumbents-induced CE variables tCI ,
t
tI 2  and 
t
tK 1
 . Below we include additional 
control variables to account for excess capacity held for non-mobility deterrence 
reasons. 
t
tE 2  is expected to increase excess capacity, but without any strategic 
consequence. With ( tS ) and without (
'
tS ) lumpiness effects tobit regressions are used. 
In the estimation of indicators (7) and (8) we include t, the standard deviation 
of year-to-year rates of output growth from t-5 to t for petroleum refining products. This 
measure should point out excess capacity held to accommodate the demand variability 
of petroleum refining products in the U.K. over the period 1948-1998. We also include 
the time trend t to capture the impact of possible time-related factors on excess capacity. 
Both variables, tt and , are expected  not to have statistically significant positive 
coefficients in the models  of (7) and (8) for our hypothesis not to be rejected. 
Note in the following models we add to Lieberman [1987b]’s, providing a more 
complete explanation of post-entry excess capacity by specifying incremental CEs as an 
explanatory variable. In particular, we fit 
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Analysis of Results 
Lack of convergence, likely due to the low number of uncensored observations 
(only 41% of changes in the total industry capacity stock corresponded to incremental 
CEs), makes us re-specify the model in equation (6). This leaves us then with a quite 
similar version of equation (6) that permits us to test sub-hypotheses 1) and 2), to know:  
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Note that testing sub-hypotheses 1) and 2) would not be possible with the 
original specification of equation (6). In the tobit fit of equation (6´) convergence is 
achieved. The model in table 1 is overall significant and well specified at a 5.00% 
significance level. Based upon this, at a 5.00% significance level too, we cannot reject 
sub-hypothesis 1) nor sub-hypothesis 2), except with respect to 
I
t 2 . After a Wald test, 
we can reject sub-hypothesis 2) with respect to
I
t 2  only. 
Therefore, results in table 1 show that incumbents’ incremental CEs in the 
U.K.’s petroleum refining industry during 1948-1998 were not influenced by entrants’ 
Greenfield refineries. Instead incumbents pursued the substitution of their own 
Greenfield refinery capacity when they timed incremental CEs. 
According to this Tobit model, for each tonne of crude processing capacity 
added through their new refineries, incumbents diminished incremental CEs on existent 
refineries approximately 1.12 tonnes. Hence, we can hold incumbents during 1948-1998 
did not time incremental CEs in their already existent refineries in order to deter 
mobility of other incumbents.  
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We infer that incumbents timed incremental CEs with the objective of 
substituting their Greenfield refinery capacity, instead of deterring each others´ CEs.  
  On the other hand, in table 2 we get the impact of incremental CEs on existent 
refineries excess capacity. In this table, the models of equations (9) and (10) are 
significant and well specified tobit regressions. We reject the null sub-hypothesis in 3) 
for 2j but not for 1j ; we reject the null sub-hypothesis in 4); and we reject the null sub-
hypothesis in 5) for 4j  but not for 5j , which is not significant. 
With lumpiness effects in the estimation of equation (9) in table 2, observe a rise 
of 1.00% in incremental CEs on existent refineries in year t-2 reduced excess capacity 
in year t 0.19%, which is contrary to the expected in our hypothesis. However, this 
aligns with the finding on the model of equation (6`), according to which, incumbents 
timed incremental CEs with the objective of substituting Greenfield refinery capacity, as 
they tried to over-utilise each additional capacity they installed on existent refineries.  
Besides, when lumpiness effects are considered in table 2, for each 1.00% 
increase in the industrial concentration index, excess capacity diminished 5.22%, and 
for each 1.00% increment of demand variability excess capacity increased 1.25%. 
Additionally, excess capacity tended to diminish 0.022% during 1948-1998 with 
lumpiness effects. 
We reject the null sub-hypothesis in 6) for 2l  but not for 1l , which is not 
significant; we reject the null sub-hypothesis in 7); and we do not reject the null sub-
hypothesis in 8) because none coefficient is significant. Without lumpiness effects in the 
estimation of equation (10) in table 2, for each 1.00% increase in the industrial 
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concentration index, excess capacity diminished 5.21%, and for each 1.00% increment 
of demand variability excess capacity increased 1.83%.  
 Although incremental CEs on existent refineries only are significant on excess 
capacity when lumpiness is accounted for, observe without lumpiness effects demand 
variability generates 46.4% more excess capacity than with lumpiness effects if 
incremental CEs on existent refineries are specified, which shows the relevance of this 
non entry/mobility deterrence variable, because it is shown that demand variability 
raised excess capacity after ruling out for explicit non-deterring aimed excess capacity. 
 
 Conclusions 
 We can state that incumbents were willing to commit themselves to use capacity 
fully when they added capacity to existent refineries after commencement of entry, 
since they tended to over-utilise them. This is meaningful in an industry where capacity 
costs are irreversible and sunk such that capacity is indeed costly. 
In this paper we have shown that even excess capacity that was intended to be 
strategic was generated by demand variability. The inclusion of incremental CEs 
strengthens these findings. We conclude that excess capacity was mainly a result of 
demand variability in post-entry CEs during 1948-1998 in the U.K.´s Petroleum 
Refining Industry, because incumbents did not use it as a mobility deterring tool.  
Consequently, we reject our hypothesis, because excess capacity was not 
generated with mobility deterring purposes, and incumbents timed incremental CEs to 
accommodate each other’s Greenfield refineries. Observe demand variability is now 
playing a crucial role not contemplated before. 
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             ttK 1
           
                      
  cons  0.7712628       
    (0.053)               
   
  1tU   0.2085432   
    (0.606)  
 
  1tg   -0.0458184   
    (0.870) 
 
   
  
1
2


t
tE   -0.2285983  
    (0.305) 
   
  
1
2


t
tE   -0.2272634  
    (0.304) 
 
  
1
2


t
tI   0.0697457  
    (0.761)  
 
  ttI 2   -1.117069  
    (0.000)  
 
 
Log likelihood    19.057978  
Number of obs   21   
LR 2   23.88*   
Prob > 2   0.0005   
P>|t| of hatsq   0.302    
*Six d.o.f 
 
 
 
Table 1. Incremental Capacity Expansions Model
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           cons            t          t        tCI         
2
1


t
tK
               
2
2


t
tI       
 
tS          1.727185          -0.0217009    1.251207     -5.218529     -0.1906488          -0.3734054    
  
                      (0.002)           (0.017)   (0.026)  (0.003)      (0.101)      (0.291)   
 
 '
tS      1.551195     -0.0183368     1.83078  -5.214304  -0.2308034     -0.4303065               
                          (0.026)                (0.113)   (0.036)  (0.034)      (0.112)     (0.336) 
 
 tS ESTIMATES:        
 '
tS  ESTIMATES:  
   Log likelihood 6.3358886      Log likelihood  -0.5285867 
Number of obs
 
30       Number of obs  30 
LR 2(5)     25.51       LR 2(5)   16.93  
Prob > 2(5)        0.0001       Prob > 2(5)   0.0046 
P>|t| of hatsq  0.883          P>|t| of hatsq   0.525 
           
 
 
Table 2. Excess Capacity with incremental Capacity Expansions  
